



Media Persuasion through Slanted Language: Evidence from the Coverage of Immigration

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Abstract

Can the language used by mass media to cover policy relevant issues affect readers' policy preferences? I examine this question for the case of immigration, exploiting an abrupt ban on the term "illegal immigrant" in wire content distributed to media outlets by the Associated Press (AP). Using text data on AP dispatches and the content of a large number of US print and online outlets, I find that after the ban articles mentioning "illegal immigrant" decline by 28% in outlets that rely on AP relative to others. This change in language appears to have had a tangible impact on readers' views on immigration. Following AP's ban, individuals exposed to outlets relying more heavily on AP tend to support less restrictive immigration and border security policies. The effect is driven by frequent readers and does not apply to views on issues other than immigration.

Keywords: *Mass media, media slant, framing, immigration*

JEL Classification: D72, L82, Z13

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1 Introduction

Political actors choose carefully the words they put out in the media. In the US, Republicans and Democrats often use strikingly different language to describe the same issue, in an attempt to promote views favorable to their platform. Republican politicians and right-leaning media speak about the “Chinese virus”, the “death tax”, and “illegal immigrants”, while Democrats and left-leaning media refer to the same issues as “Covid-19”, the “estate tax”, and “undocumented immigrants”.¹

Although slanted language is widespread in political rhetoric, evidence on its persuasiveness, i.e. on whether it can indeed sway readers in the intended direction, is lacking. This question poses an empirical challenge for at least two reasons. First, votes-maximizing politicians and profit-maximizing media have a clear incentive to choose their slant to appeal to the audience’s preference for like-minded content (Gentzkow and Shapiro 2006). Second, slanted language can be accompanied by other politically motivated choices, ranging from selective emphasis on certain issues, to outright endorsement of policies or candidates, which are likely to independently affect the policy views of the audience.

To overcome these challenges, I propose a supply-side source of variation in media slant. I take advantage of the fact that many US media outlets source some of their content from the Associated Press (AP) – a newswire agency that gathers and distributes news to subscribing outlets. Since AP distributes a single news feed to all subscribers, their aim is to produce neutral coverage that appeals to outlets from all sides of the political spectrum (Fenby 1986). This philosophy has led to extremely strict and rigid guidelines for the use of politically sensitive language.

I exploit an abrupt reversal in AP’s guidelines on the use of a specific politically sensitive

¹The implicit policy positions behind these phrases are easy to recognize. “The Chinese virus” is presumably an attempt to shift responsibility for the crisis to China (<https://edition.cnn.com/2020/03/20/politics/donald-trump-china-virus-coronavirus/index.html>). “Death tax” highlights the alleged unfairness of taxing the deceased, while “estate tax” draws attention to the wealth of the people it applies to (<https://www.businessinsider.com/death-tax-or-estate-tax-2017-10?r=US&IR=T>). “Illegal immigrants” underscores the transgression of crossing the border, while “undocumented immigrants” presents the issue of legal status as a formality (https://www.al.com/news/2018/07/illegal_vs_undocumented_the_he.html).

term – “illegal immigrant”. In April 2013, after years of resisting requests to revise its guidelines on the language on immigration, AP abruptly switched from officially *recommending* the term “illegal immigrant” to refer to people living in the US without legal authorization, to *banning* its use in AP wire articles.

The ban happened at a time when the issue of immigration, and the language used to talk about it, was extremely politicized. Figure 1 illustrates the partisan divide in use of “illegal immigrant” in political speech and in the media.² In Congress, Republican representatives mention “illegal immigrant” about 50% of the time they mention “immigrant”, while this frequency is less than 5% among Democrats. Similarly, the term appears twice as frequently in the right-leaning Fox News and Washington Times, compared to the left-leaning MSNBC and Washington Post.

Beyond the clear political charge of the banned term, the setting of AP’s ban has several features that make it attractive to study the causal effects of slanted language. Since the decision on the ban was taken centrally by AP executives, and given that AP serves thousands of subscribers with different ideological positions, the ban is plausibly exogenous from the perspective of any *individual* subscribing outlet. In other words, the ban produces variation in an input to the editorial production function that is orthogonal to the views of end-readers. Furthermore, media outlets differ in the extent to which they rely on AP’s input. This allows me to compare outlets with different degrees of use of this input, i.e. different *AP-intensity*, and the views of their respective readers before vs after the ban.

I start off my analysis by documenting how the ban affected AP’s language, using the text of all immigration-related AP dispatches released between 2009 and 2017. I find that, as intended, the ban caused the term “illegal immigrant” to instantaneously disappear from AP’s feed, but caused no sharp change in the frequency of the word “immigrant”. As a substitute for “illegal”, the new guidelines suggested the phrase “living in the county ille-

²The reason for this divide can be traced back to deliberate party strategy. For example, “illegal immigrant” was advocated by Republican strategist Frank Luntz, who is famous for developing talking points for Republican candidates and for coining terms such as “death tax” (instead of “estate tax” or “inheritance tax”) and “climate change” (instead of “global warming”). Luntz has urged Republicans to always use the term “illegal immigrant” and to put an emphasis on border security, calling the linguistic distinction between “illegal immigrant” and “undocumented immigrant” the “political battle of the decade” (Luntz 2007).

gally” or “without legal permission”. However, text analysis reveals that these reformulations compensate for at most half of the decline in mentions of “illegal immigrant” in dispatches containing the word “immigrant”, and that no other phrase fills the remaining gap. Hence, at least half of the treatment in this natural experiment consists of substitution from “illegal immigrant” to “immigrant”, without any reference to legal status.

I then track how this change in AP’s language diffuses into the language of AP-subscribing outlets, using text data from more than 2000 print and online outlets. I employ a difference-in-difference strategy comparing the monthly number of “illegal immigrant” articles relative to “immigrant” articles before and after the ban, in media outlets with different AP-intensity at baseline. Specifically, I measure AP-intensity as the share of “immigrant” articles published by each outlet in the 12 months prior to the ban that either credit AP explicitly, or are flagged by a plagiarism detection algorithm comparing their text to that of recent AP dispatches.³

My results suggest a large degree of diffusion – one standard deviation in AP-intensity causes a decline in the frequency of “illegal immigrant” articles by 14%. Put differently, outlets with positive AP-intensity decrease their use of the term by on average 28% compared to ones with zero AP-intensity, and for outlets in the top quartile of the AP-intensity distribution this decline reaches 60%. This effect is driven mostly by articles copied from AP, as opposed to original ones. As with AP dispatches, I find that the ban had no effect on the *volume* of immigration coverage, measured by mentions of “immigrant” over total articles.

Finally, I exploit AP’s ban to identify the effect of “illegal immigrant” articles on readers’ views on immigration policy, using pre- and post-ban waves of the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES). To identify the reduced form effect of the ban, I employ a difference-in-difference strategy comparing CCES respondents before and after the ban, in counties with different AP-intensity of locally circulated newspapers. Alternatively, to scale magnitudes in terms of the effect of “illegal immigrant” articles circulated in the respondent’s county, I instrument their number (normalized by the number of “immigrant” articles) with the interaction of county-level AP-intensity and the timing of the ban. This strategy accounts

³This procedure aims to capture the use of AP copy in cases when AP is credited as a source, and in ones in which AP is not credited (Cage et al. 2020).

for time-invariant effects of other county characteristics correlated with AP-intensity, but relies on the assumption that their effect on readers did not change in coincidence with the timing of the ban. I address this threat by controlling for a wide range of baseline characteristics interacted with time.

The results suggest that one standard deviation higher AP-intensity of locally circulated newspapers is associated with 0.7 percentage points, or 1.25% lower public support for increasing border security after the ban. This implies a persuasion rate of 1.5 to 3.8% for the treatment of 1 standard deviation higher AP-intensity, which translates into (at least) 9 fewer “illegal immigrant” per year.

While this result applies to the sample of all CCES respondents, it is more pronounced for regular print newspaper readers, who represent 33% of the sample. On the other hand, the effect is stronger among respondents with (self-reported) lower interest in politics. This is consistent with passive news consumers being more persuadable by slanted language.

I observe a similar shift in support for restricting immigration in 3 out of the 4 policy questions I am able to track across pre- and post-ban survey waves⁴, as well in an index aggregating all immigration-related CCES questions including rotating ones. However, this effect appears to be specific to policy preferences related to immigration. I find no significant change in responses on other issues that traditionally split along party lines, such as abortion, gay marriage or taxes and redistribution. On net, the relatively small change in views on immigration seems to be insufficient to sway voting intentions for Republican candidates.

This paper contributes to a large literature on the effects of media on political attitudes and outcomes. One strand exploits quasi-random or experimentally manipulated variation in access to a particular media outlet to estimate its causal effects (DellaVigna and Kaplan 2007; Martin and Yurukoglu 2017; Enikolopov et al. 2011; Durante et al. 2019; Gerber et al. 2009). By design, the “treatment” in this strategy consists of the bundle of editorial choices that differentiate the outlet of interest from alternative sources of information. Fewer studies

⁴The effect of the ban is significant for support for increasing border security, for allowing police to question suspected illegal immigrants, and for fining firms that employ illegal immigrants. It is not significant for opposition to amnesty.

are focused on a specific mechanism of media persuasion – e.g. the volume of coverage of a politician or a politically sensitive issue (Snyder and Strömberg 2010) or direct endorsement of candidates for office (Chiang and Knight 2011). This paper fits into the second category, but differs by studying a different and arguably more subtle mechanism – that of slanted language.⁵

This paper is also closely related to a literature on slant in the language used by media and politicians (Groseclose and Milyo 2005; Gentzkow and Shapiro 2010; Gentzkow et al. 2019), which has focused on the measurement of slant and on studying of its determinants. Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) show that the attitudes of consumers explain about 20% of the variation in slant. Here I study the reverse direction of causality – from exposure to slanted language towards the political views of readers, trying to separate this channel from the tendency of media outlets to serve consumers’ preference for like-minded content.

My findings suggest that views on immigration are sensitive to small changes in the framing of the issue. This is in line with recent work documenting a large degree of misinformation regarding the characteristics of immigrants in the US and Europe and showing that policy views can shift in response to correcting misperceptions (Grigorieff et al. 2019; Alesina et al. 2019; Hatte et al. 2019).

Framing effects, which occur when differences in the presentation of an issue affect individuals’ responses, are subject to a large literature in the fields of communication and social psychology (Strömberg 2015; Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007; Chong and Druckman 2007). This can be conceptualized as individuals trading off different concerns when evaluating an issue, and the frame changing the relative weight of these concerns. In this context, reading about “illegal immigrants” rather than about “immigrants” may increase the weight on concerns about border security, due to the fact that the former phrase includes direct information on legal status and the latter does not (rational framing). On the other hand, reading

⁵It is not clear a priori how the persuasive effect of slanted language might compare to that of more obvious biases (say, direct electoral endorsements). On the one hand, slanted language is a mild treatment. On the other hand, more direct biases are easier for readers to notice and discount by either switching away from the biased media outlet or by taking its ideological stance into account when making political choices (Durante and Knight 2012; Chiang and Knight 2011).

about “illegal immigrants” rather than about “immigrants living in the country without legal permission” conveys the same information content, but may still be an effective frame if it more easily brings to mind concerns that have in the past been connected to the term “illegal immigrant”, such as border security (behavioral framing). In terms of methodology, most of the existing evidence of framing effects comes from survey experiments, while this paper provides large-scale observational evidence.

The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 I discuss the details of the ban and analyze how the text of immigration-related articles distributed by AP changed. In section 3 I track the propagation of AP’s language into the language of AP-dependent media. In section 4 I analyze the effect of the ban on attitudes related to immigration policy.

2 The Ban and It’s Effect on AP’s Language

2.1 Background

The term ‘illegal immigrant’ was dropped from AP’s guidelines on April 3rd 2013. The decision was rather unexpected since AP had previously resisted pressures from the advocacy groups to change their language policy.⁶ Up until the change was announced, AP’s guidelines stated that “illegal immigrant” was the *preferred* term while the alternative endorsed by the left – “undocumented immigrant” – was not allowed as AP considers it legally inaccurate (as continues to be the case to this day).

Appendix A presents the exact formulation of AP’s guidelines before and after April 2013. As “illegal immigrant” was banned, AP proposed the following substitutes: “living / entering the county illegally / without legal permission”.⁷ Yet, AP executives recognized in their statement that these alternatives are likely harder for writers to use in text compared to the simple label “illegal” (<https://blog.ap.org/announcements/illegal-immigrant->

⁶<https://www.sfexaminer.com/national-news/society-for-professional-journalists-says-using-the-term-illegal-immigrant-is-unconstitutional/>

⁷According to the guidelines, the ban does not concern “illegal immigrant” used in direct quotes, or the phrase “illegal *immigration*”.

no-more). I return to this point in the interpretation of the results. The ban took effect immediately in the online guidelines guidelines, which are also embedded in text editors (see figure A1).

2.2 Data

To analyze how the language used by AP changed in response to the ban, I obtain the text of all immigration-related AP-articles released in the period 2009-2017 from *Factiva* (<https://global.factiva.com>). I search the database for mentions of the word “immigrant” (singular or plural), limiting the source to “Associated Press Newswires” and record the date, headline, word-count and full text of each article.

2.3 Text Analysis Results

As a first check of how AP’s language on the issue of immigration changed after the ban, I examine the headlines released by AP. Figure 3 depicts the most frequent 3-grams encountered in headlines of “immigrant” dispatches. The label “illegal” clearly features prominently before the ban, and virtually disappears after. Rather than substitute “illegal” by another adjective, many headlines appear to simply omit any direct reference to legal status. Appendix A illustrates this point with two examples of AP dispatches covering the same issue – state laws on immigrants drivers licenses – but released just before vs just after the ban.

The timing of this change in language coincides very precisely with the announcement of the ban. Figure 4 shows the monthly number of AP dispatches mentioning the phrase “illegal immigrant” as percent of dispatches mentioning “immigrant”. This percentage drops from an average of 40% in the period before April 2013, to less than 5% after, suggesting close to perfect compliance.⁸ The lower panel of the same figure suggests no sharp change in the total volume of articles mentioning the word “immigrant”.

To examine more systematically the potential substitutes for the banned term “illegal”, I

⁸Note that this figure includes mentions of “illegal immigrant” in direct quotes, which are not affected by the ban.

compute the correlations between the word “immigrant” and each other unigram featured in the full-text corpus of AP dispatches, differentiating between pre- and post-ban.⁹ I plot the results for the top 50 correlates of “immigrant” in figure 5, showing correlations in the full text in the upper panel, and correlations in headlines in the lower panel. The first pattern that emerges from the figure is that “illegal” is clearly an outlier from the 45-degree line – its pre-ban correlation with “immigrant” is 0.66 (0.54) – more than twice the magnitude of the next-highest coefficient – and it drops dramatically to 0.21 (0.07) post-ban. The second noticeable pattern is that no other unigram compensates for this decline. The closest candidate in article text is “illegally” – indeed, its correlation with “immigrant” increases significantly after the ban, but the magnitude of this increase is only about half of what would be needed to compensate for the decline of “illegal”. In headlines, the substitution is of an even smaller magnitude, likely due to the fact that the synonyms proposed by AP are inconvenient to use in a headline.¹⁰

An alternative, and arguably more flexible way to examine how language changes due to the ban, is to ask which words and phrases have the highest power in predicting whether a given AP dispatch was published before or after the ban. Let $f_{pl,before}$ and $f_{pl,after}$ denote the total number of times phrase p of length l (one to or four words) is used before and after the ban, respectively. Let $f_{\sim pl,before}$ and $f_{\sim pl,after}$ denote the total occurrences of length- l phrases that are not phrase p – before and after the ban respectively. Let χ_{pl}^2 denote Pearson’s χ^2 statistic for each phrase:

$$\chi_{pl}^2 = \frac{(f_{pl,before}f_{\sim pl,after}f_{\sim pl,after}f_{\sim pl,before})^2}{(f_{pl,before} + f_{pl,after})(f_{pl,before} + f_{\sim pl,before})(f_{pl,after} + f_{\sim pl,after})(f_{\sim pl,before} + f_{\sim pl,after})} \quad (1)$$

Figure 6 presents the 20 words and phrases with highest χ_{pl}^2 . “Illegal”, “illegal immigrant” and “illegal immigrants” clearly emerge as the phrases most diagnostic of whether an article is published before or after the ban. Notably, “illegally” has only 1/4 of the predictive power

⁹I stem all words with the exception of “illegal” and “illegally” to account for the fact that while “illegal” was banned, “illegally” was, if anything, endorsed in the new guidelines.

¹⁰I obtain very similar results with sentence- rather than article-level correlations.

of “illegal”, confirming that AP’s synonyms were adopted only partially.

To rule out the possibility that these results reflect a shift in topics occupying the news cycle over the sample period, in appendix A I repeat the exercise separately for each of five topics estimated with a Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA) model. The estimated topics can be labeled as follows: law enforcement, immigration-related legislation, immigrants’ integration and social issues, international issues such as the refugee crisis in Europe, and elections (Figure C1). The results discussed above are confirmed within each topic (with the exception of the χ^2 ranking within the international affairs topic).

Finally, I examine whether the ban on “illegal immigrant” was part of a broader trend towards more liberal slant in AP’s immigration coverage. I compute a measure of immigration-specific slant based on the similarity of AP’s language to that used by Republicans vs Democrats in Congress, following Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010). In order to isolate the influence of the ban from other dimensions of AP’s language, I also do compute a version of slant excluding any phrases containing the phrase “illegal immigrant” and its substitutes. Appendix A.1 describes this procedure in detail. Figure 7 presents the evolution of the 2 versions of the slant over time. The one that does not account for the ban on “illegal immigrant” follows closely the trend for AP’s use of this phrase. This is intuitive since use of “illegal immigrant” is highly predictive of a Republican speaker in Congress (see figure 1), and therefore receives a high weight in the measure of overall slant. Once it is excluded and we focus on other dimensions of language, the trend in slant appears stable over time, with an only slight change at the time of the ban.

Taking these results together, the analysis of AP text suggests that: (1) As intended, the label “illegal” virtually disappears after the ban; (2) This decline is only partially compensated by the substitutes proposed by AP, while the remainder appears to omit any direct reference to legal status; (3) Other dimensions of AP’s language did not change dramatically with the ban.

3 Diffusion

In this section I analyze the diffusion of AP’s ban into the language of more than 2500 media outlets with different baseline reliance on AP copy (“AP-intensity”).¹¹

3.1 Data

Media content: Mentions of “illegal immigrant”. My main data source for media content is Newslibrary (newslibrary.com). I focus on print and online outlets that are covered continuously between July 1st 2009 and July 1st 2017 – there are 2566 such outlets. To cover some of the major US newspapers which are missing in Newslibrary, I supplement with data from ProQuest (proquest.com). This adds 125 newspapers.

To construct measures of the language used in immigration coverage I search the database for articles that mention the phrase “illegal immigrant” (in singular or plural), and separately, for articles that mention the word “immigrant” (in singular or plural). This search results in about one million “immigrant” articles and 200,000 “illegal immigrant” articles. I record each article’s date of publication, name of the publishing outlet, by-line, headline, word-count, and the text of the first paragraph.

Using this information, I compute for each outlet and each month the number of articles that mention “illegal immigrant” normalized by the monthly number of articles that mention “immigrant”. I repeat the procedure with wordcount instead of number of articles, for the phrase “illegal immigration” as a percentage of “immigration”, and for the potential synonyms “undocumented immigrant” and “unauthorized immigrant” normalized by “immigrant”. Lastly, I collect mentions of the alternatives endorsed by AP – “living in / entering the country illegally” or “[...] without legal permission”.

¹¹This sample includes all US print and online outlets for which I am able to gather content data. However, the second stage analysis of readers policy views is restricted to the sample of print newspapers which allows me match geographic newspaper markets to the location of survey respondents. For consistency with this sample, Appendix A.1 replicates all results presented in this section restricting the sample to print newspapers.

Identifying articles copied from AP. I classify an article as sourced from AP if either one of two conditions is true: (1) AP is explicitly mentioned in the first paragraph (e.g. “according to AP”), or (2) a large portion of the text of the article is verbatim identical of to the text of a recent AP dispatch.

To capture the cases in which AP is credited explicitly, I search for mentions of “Associated Press” or “AP” in the lead paragraph or byline of the article. A similar procedure was employed by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010) to identify and, in their case, *exclude* news-wire content. Their audit of excluded articles suggests that “virtually all” articles identified in this way are indeed wire-copy. However, if media outlets use AP-content without explicit attribution, this procedure alone is likely to produce false negatives. Evidence on copying from the French news wire AFP suggests that this may indeed be a common occurrence (Cage et al. 2020).

Therefore, I additionally run the text of each article through a plagiarism-detection algorithm. The goal is to detect articles in which large portions of text are verbatim copy from an AP dispatch released in the previous day. I describe this procedure in detail in Appendix A.2.

AP-Intensity. To proxy a media outlet’s exposure to changes in AP style, I measure the rate of copying from AP over the 12-months prior to the announcement of the ban. I focus on this period to avoid concerns about potential endogenous selection into or out of AP use based on the change in AP’s language policy. I measure *AP-intensity* as the the number of articles copied from AP per 1000 articles in this period – either credited to AP explicitly or flagged by plagiarism detection. Since this variable contains many zeros and has a skewed distribution, I take the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation.

3.2 Empirical Strategy

To estimate the rate of diffusion from AP’s language into that of AP-subscribing outlets, I implement a Difference-in-Difference strategy with contiguous treatment. Specifically, I

exploit the time-variation produced by the announcement of the ban and variation across media outlets in their exposure to the ban, proxied by AP-intensity. I estimate equations of the following form:

$$Illimm/Imm_{mt} = \alpha_m + \beta_t + \rho APintensity_m \times PostBan_t + \epsilon_{mt}, \quad (2)$$

where $Illimm/Imm_{mt}$ denotes the number of articles in media outlet m and month t that mention the phrase "illegal immigrant" as percent of articles mentioning "immigrant", AP_m is AP-intensity measured in the 12 months prior to the ban, $PostBan_t$ is a dummy for post-April 2013, and α_m and β_t are outlet- and calendar month FEs respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the outlet level. To account for the fact that $Illimm/Imm_{mt}$ is imprecisely estimated when the denominator, i.e. the number of "immigrant" articles is low, which is a frequent occurrence at monthly frequency, in my preferred specification this regression is weighted by the number of "immigrant" articles.

The identifying assumption of this strategy is that the frequency of "illegal immigrant" articles in outlets with high AP-intensity vs outlets with low AP-intensity would have followed parallel trends in the absence of the ban.

3.3 Results

Preliminary evidence. Before proceeding to the estimation of the regression specified in 2, I examine visually the raw frequency of "illegal immigrant" articles in AP-intensive vs non AP-intensive outlets. Figure 8 shows these two series. While non AP-intensive media appear to gradually decrease their use of the term already prior to the ban, the use by AP-intensive media remains flat and quite high up until it exhibits a sharp decline coinciding with the ban. This pattern is in line with anecdotal evidence. For a long time, AP was resistant to demands to change their language policy, while in other media use of the term was gradually declining due to the controversy surrounding it. The figure also suggests that the ban was somewhat of an aggregate shock: even non AP-intensive media experience a decline at the

time of the ban, albeit of a smaller magnitude. This is likely due to other outlets interpreting the ban – which was widely publicized – as a signal that the phrase “illegal immigrant” is no longer politically correct. Yet, the difference in magnitudes in the reactions of the two groups of outlets indicates that AP-intensity is a useful proxy for the degree of exposure to this aggregate shock.

Diffusion estimates. Table 1 presents the main regression results corresponding to specification 2. I find a significant negative effect of the ban on use of the term – the magnitude suggests that one standard deviation increase in AP-intensity ($=2.1$) leads to 3 p.p lower frequency of “illegal immigrant” after the ban, or 14% relative to the mean. In addition to month fixed effects, in columns (3) and (7) I control for month times state fixed effects to absorb the effects of potentially confounding factors that vary over time and by state, such as the availability of state-specific newsworthy events related to illegal immigration. In columns (4) and (8) I control for outlet-specific linear time trends to account for possible differential trends depending on outlet characteristics correlated with AP-intensity. The estimates are stable to these controls, and if anything, *increase* in magnitude. Column (5) shows that despite not being officially banned by AP, use of the term “illegal immigration” also decreased (though by only half the magnitude of “illegal immigrant”).

In figure 9 I estimate a more flexible specification discretizing the AP-intensity distribution. Specifically, I interact each quartile of the positive part of the AP-intensity distribution with *PostBan*, leaving outlets with zero AP-intensity as the reference category. The results suggest a roughly monotonic relationship in AP-intensity. The strongest effect comes from the top quartile, for which the effect amounts to a decline of 12 percentage points, or about than 60% relative to the mean.

Robustness. The result that outlets with higher AP-intensity decrease their use of the term “illegal immigrant” after the ban is stable to a number of alternative specifications and definitions of the variables of interest. In table 2 I estimate specifications replacing the dependent variable with the number of “illegal immigrant” articles, dropping weights, replacing

number of articles with word-count and with number of headlines, replacing continuous AP-intensity with a dummy for positive AP-intensity, and replacing *PostBan* with the time-series of “illegal immigrant” articles (normalized by “immigrant” articles) released monthly by AP.

In table 3 I run the baseline regression with variations of the AP-intensity variable. Instead of accounting for both credited copying and plagiarism from AP, in column (2) I consider only the share of articles credited to AP, and in column (3) – only the share of articles flagged by plagiarism detection. The two measures have a correlation of 0.56 and yield very similar results to the baseline. In column (4), rather than examining the sample of “immigrant” articles, I consider articles on any topic and define AP-intensity as the share of total articles published the 12 months before the ban that credit AP. Finally, as a placebo exercise, in column (5) I consider use of Reuters rather than AP. Since the Reuters news-wire did not change their style rules regarding “illegal immigrant”, prior reliance on Reuters should not be associated with the degree of reaction to the ban. Indeed, I find no change in use of the term depending on Reuters-intensity.

Diffusion over time. To verify that trends in the use of “illegal immigrant” in high- versus low-AP-intensity outlets did not start to diverge already prior the ban, I split the interaction of AP intensity and *Post Ban* into a set of interactions with quarterly leads and lags. The results are plotted in figure 10. I find that if anything, the relative frequency of “illegal immigrant” seems to increase up until the ban (in other words, trends were diverging rather than converging), at which point it falls abruptly. The decline is persistent, in line with the permanently low supply of “illegal immigrant” AP dispatches.

In figure 11 I decompose this effect into articles copied from by AP (with or without credit) vs. original content, and find that it is driven primarily by articles sourced from AP. Table D4 presents the decomposed effects on “illegal immigrant” articles credited to AP, on those flagged by my plagiarism detection algorithm but not credited to AP, and on the rest, all expressed in percent of total “immigrant” articles. The results suggest large effects for the first two categories relative to their respective means, and a small (but significant) effect

for the third.

Heterogeneity by slant. Media outlets decide on the extent to which they use want to use AP dispatches and are free to edit their language as they wish. Therefore, a natural question is whether the diffusion effect applies only to left-leaning outlets, which are presumably more likely to agree with AP’s new language. To answer this question I analyze a sub-sample of about 340 newspapers which I can match to the index of political slant constructed by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010). Splitting this sample at the 33rd and 66th percentile with respect to this measure of ideological leaning, I find that the magnitude of the decline is indeed largest for left-leaning outlets, but also negative and significant for centrist and right-leaning newspapers (table 5).

Synonyms and volume of immigration coverage. Having established that the change in AP’s language diffused into the *language* used to talk about immigration across different media outlets, in table 6 I examine whether it also affected the *volume* of immigration coverage. As with AP-dispatches, I find that the synonyms proposed by AP (“live(-ing)/enter(-ing) the country illegally / without legal permission”) compensated only partially for the decline in the phrase “illegal immigrant”. Also consistent with the language of AP dispatches, I find that the number of articles mentioning the word “immigrant” (normalized by total articles) was not affected by ban. I same null-effect for articles mentioning the word “immigration” over total articles.

To sum up, several features of the post-ban language of AP dispatches diffuse into the language used by media outlets, consistent with the result that copied articles drive the majority of the effect. Crucially, since the volume of immigration coverage remains unaffected, this is primarily a shock to *slanted language* and not to other features of immigration coverage.

4 Effects on Readers' Views on Immigration Policy

In this section I analyze how the ban affected public opinion on immigration policy by comparing pre- and post-ban responses in the CCES electoral survey for respondents living in counties with different AP-intensity of locally circulated newspapers.

4.1 Data

4.1.1 Aggregation to the county level.

Since the CCES survey does not ask *which* newspaper the respondent reads, I rely on county of residence to assess exposure to locally circulated newspapers. Therefore, the first step in this analysis is to aggregate my measures of newspapers' content to the county level. To do so, I obtain data on the geographic distribution of daily newspapers' circulation from Alliance of Audited Media (AAM). I use their Fall 2012 report, which includes circulation by newspaper and zip-code from the most recent audit prior to this date, and aggregate zip-code level data to the county level.¹² Finally, since AAM does not collect geographically disaggregated data for low-circulation newspapers, I impute these observations with data on total circulation from the Editor and Publishes yearbooks, assuming that small newspapers circulate mainly in the county of their headquarters.¹³

I match this data to the sample of Newslibrary/ProQuest media outlets based on the name, town and state of the newspaper. I then keep counties for which newspapers matched to the Newslibrary/ProQuest sample account for at least 90% of total county circulation. This ensures that the county-level data on newspapers' content is measured with reasonable precision. The resulting dataset contains about about 2300 counties (out of a total of 3000), and 800 daily newspapers (out of a total of 1200).

I aggregate AP-intensity to the county level by averaging the AP-intensity of newspapers circulated within the county (in number of AP-sourced articles per 1000), weighting each

¹²For the largest nationally circulated newspapers AAM only reports circulation at the DMA level. For these cases I assign circulation to counties in proportion to voting-age population.

¹³The same procedure is used by Seamans and Zhu (2014).

newspaper by its county-specific circulation. Formally:

$$AP_c = \frac{\sum_m (circ_{mc} \times AP_m)}{\sum_m circ_{mc}}, \quad (3)$$

where $circ_{mc}$ is circulation of newspaper m in county c . As in the outlet-level analysis, I take the inverse hyperbolic spline transformation of this variable. Figure 12 presents the resulting geographic distribution of AP-intensity. Similarly, I aggregate the percentage of “illegal immigrant” relative to “immigrant” articles by county and year, again weighting by circulation:

$$Illimm/Imm_{cy} = \frac{\sum_m (circ_{mcy} \times Illimm/Imm_{my})}{\sum_m circ_{mcy}}. \quad (4)$$

Correlates of AP-intensity. In order to understand the correlates of AP-intensity, I collect data on county-level demographic, economic and political characteristics. Data on annual county population is from ICHS. Data on the urban share of population is from the 2010 census. Racial composition, share college educated and share foreign-born are from the 2012 5-year American Community Survey, and the Republican vote share in the 2012 presidential election is from Dave Leip’s Atlas. Finally, county-level newspaper circulation per capita is estimated with data from the Alliance of Audited Media combined with the Editor and Publisher yearbooks.

Figure 13 presents the univariate correlations of each of these variables with AP-intensity. AP-intensity is significantly negatively correlated with population size and density, with the share of college educated, with the share of foreign-born and with county-level newspaper circulation. This is consistent with the notion that smaller newspapers in less urban areas are more likely to resort to sourcing content from AP, rather than producing original reporting. A more urban, higher educated audience, as well as one with more immigrants may also have higher demand for original content, particularly on immigration.

4.1.2 The CCES Survey

To assess how public opinion on immigration policy changed in response to the ban, I use a large nationally representative survey – the *Cooperative Congressional Election Study* (CCES). CCES is a repeated cross-section with more than 50,000 respondents per wave (with smaller waves in some years), carried out roughly every 2 years.¹⁴ The survey is administered online and a large portion of participants are YouGov panelists. Conveniently for my setting, a large share of survey respondents (33%) report that they regularly read a newspaper in print (i.e. that they have done so in the day before the survey).

Views on Immigration Policy. Each CCES respondent is asked to select the immigration policies she thinks the US government should undertake, out of a list of options. The set of policies differs in each wave – see Appendix A.3 for the full list. Two policies appear consistently in all years between 2009 and 2017: “*Increase the number of border patrols on the U.S.-Mexican border*” and “*Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes*”.

For each policy, I code support for *restricting* immigration (e.g. increasing border control/*not* granting amnesty) as 1, and opposition as 0. I also compute an index aggregating choices on *all* 9 immigration policies featured in the questionnaire in the respective year, including rotating ones. I recode each choice in the direction of restricting immigration, and take the average across all standardized choices (following Kling et al. (2007)).

Views on policies other than immigration. As placebo outcomes, I also collect data on CCES questions that relate to policy issues other than immigration. Specifically, I create (1) A dummy variable for opposing a woman’s right to choose to have an abortion under any circumstances; (2) A dummy variable for preferring to cut public spending rather than increase taxes; (3) A dummy variable for opposing gay marriage; (4) A dummy variable for believing that the state of the economy has gotten worse over the past year.

¹⁴To the best of my knowledge, CCES is the only large-scale survey conducted between 2009 and 2017 that asks questions related to views on immigration policy.

4.2 Empirical Strategy

To identify the effect of exposure to the phrase "illegal immigrant" on views on immigration policy, I estimate 2SLS equations of the following form:

$$X_{cy} = \alpha_c + \beta_y + \rho \widehat{Illimm/Imm}_{cy} + \phi_y W_c + \epsilon_{cy}, \quad (5)$$

$$Illimm/Imm_{cy} = \alpha_c + \beta_y + \gamma AP_c \times PostBan_y + \phi_y W_c + \epsilon_{cy} \quad (6)$$

where X_{cy} denotes immigration policy preferences of respondents in county c and year y , $Illimm_{cy}$ denotes the percent "illegal immigrant" relative to "immigrant" articles read in that county and year, AP_c is the average AP-intensity of newspapers circulated in county c , $PostBan_y$ is an indicator equal to one for survey waves carried out after 2013, and α_c and β_y are county and survey-year fixed effects respectively. Standard errors are clustered by county.

The first-stage equation has the same form as the difference-in-difference specification from the previous section, but now estimated at the county and survey-year level (instead of media outlet and month). The excluded instrument for the potentially endogenous frequency of "illegal immigrant" articles $Illimm/Imm_{cy}$ is the interaction of AP-intensity with an indicator for the period after the ban $AP_c \times PostBan_y$. The approach is thus akin to a shift-share strategy where $PostBan$ is an aggregate shock and AP_c is local exposure to that shock.

Since the identifying variation is at the county \times survey-year level, this equation can be estimated by aggregating individual survey responses up to that level. Alternatively, it can be estimated at the respondent-level. This has the advantage of allowing to control for respondent characteristics which are likely to correlate with immigration policy attitudes.

The identifying assumption is that the interaction of AP intensity with the timing of the ban affects policy views only through exposure to the term "illegal immigrant". Time-invariant county-characteristics correlated with AP intensity are absorbed by county fixed effects. Therefore, if observed or unobserved characteristics are to confound my results, their

effect on attitudes would have to *change* at the same as the ban took effect. To account for this possibility, I examine the sensitivity of the estimates to controlling for a host of county characteristics measured at baseline and interacted with survey-year fixed effects (see figure 13 for the list of controls and their correlation with AP-intensity).

Finally, the effect identified by equation 5 is a *local* average treatment effect – it applies to readers of newspapers that change their language on immigration solely due to the change in the input supplied by AP. Such newspapers are likely to have a less pronounced stance on immigration policy and potentially more persuadable readers compared to the readers of always- or never-takers. I return to this point in the discussion of the results.

4.3 Results

First stage. I start off by replicating the analysis of the diffusion of the ban for this new sample and unit of observation, i.e. aggregating newspapers’ data to the county times year level (the 1st stage of equation 5). The results presented in figure 14 suggest that in this sample 1 standard deviation increase in AP-intensity ($= 1.5$) is associated with 9.5% lower use of the term “illegal immigrant” after the ban.

Reduced form and 2SLS. I then turn to the reduced form effect of the ban on support for restrictive immigration policies. In column (1) of table 7, I examine the effect on an index aggregating all immigration-related CCES questions, conditional on respondent characteristics and baseline county controls interacted with time. In columns (2) to (5) I examine each component of the index that I am able to look at separately, i.e. each question that is asked at least once before the ban and at least once after. With the exception of the question on amnesty, the results suggest a significant negative reduced form effect of the ban of support for restrictive policies. The magnitudes range from 1.2% to 2% reduction in support for a given policy for 1 standard deviation higher AP-intensity. Similar results obtain at the county-level, with the dependent variable collapsed by county times survey-year (table D6).

In table 8 I estimate the 2SLS version of equation 5 for the same set of outcomes, again

conditioning on respondent characteristics and county controls interacted with time. Here, the coefficient of interest is the second stage effect of locally circulated “illegal immigrant” articles on support for restrictive immigration policies. The results mirror those of the reduced form – an increase in such articles has a significantly positive effect on support for restrictive policies (with the exception of amnesty). The magnitudes range from 0.9% to 1.4% increase in support for a given policy for 1 percentage point (or 4.8%) higher share of locally circulated “illegal immigrant” articles. These results are also confirmed at the county level (table D7).

Since the border question is the only one (apart from the one on amnesty) that is asked in each CCES wave in the period of interest, I focus on this question for the remainder of this section. This has the advantage of holding the definition of the dependent variable constant over time, whereas the index aggregates policies of different severity in each wave, making comparisons over time harder to interpret.

Table 9 presents the reduced form and 2SLS effects on support for border security with alternative controls. In the first column, instead of including county and year fixed effects, I present the main effects of *PostBan* and *AP – intensity*. The results mimic those from table 1. Consistent with the fact that AP-intensive outlets had a higher frequency of “illegal immigrant” articles before the ban, immigration policy views in such counties were more conservative before the ban (main effect on AP-intensity is positive). As with its effect on use of “illegal immigrant”, the ban appears to be somewhat of an aggregate shock to views on border security (the main effect of *PostBan* is negative), but it is amplified by AP-intensity. The coefficient on the interaction of *PostBan* with AP-intensity is stable to the inclusion of fixed effects and to county controls interacted with time, which absorb the possibly changing effect of these controls on readers’ views. It is also robust to the inclusion of year \times state fixed effects, which absorb the effect of any state-level policy changes – if anything, the 2SLS increase in magnitude.

In figure 15, I estimate a flexible version of the reduced form equation, splitting the distribution of AP-intensity into quartiles and interacting each one with an indicator for the period after the ban, leaving the first quartile as the baseline category. The results suggest

that the effect is monotonic in AP-intensity.

Reduced form effect over time. To examine the dynamics of the reduced form effect, I estimate a regression including a full set of interaction of AP-intensity with indicators for survey waves, leaving the 2012 as the baseline category. In this analysis I can furthermore add the survey years 2007 and 2017, in order to examine longer-term trends. The results show no evidence of pre-trends (figures 16) – instead, the shift in policy views happens in the period after the ban, and remains roughly constant in following waves.

Robustness. In table 10 I test the robustness of the results to different versions of AP-intensity – using either attribution to AP or plagiarism detection to identify AP-sourced articles, and extending the definition to all articles, instead of ones on immigration. This yields very similar results to the baseline (columns 1 to 4 and 5 to 6). Instead, I find no differential effect of the ban depending on *Reuters*-intensity (column 4). This is reassuring since it suggests that the effect is specific to AP, rather than to the use of news wires in general.

Heterogeneity: newspaper readership and political interest. In the above results I considered the sample of all CCES respondents. Yet, respondents who regularly read a newspaper are likely more exposed to the treatment. Therefore, in table 11 I split the sample into respondents who report that they have not read a newspaper in the past 24 hours, those who report that they have, and those who report that they have read a newspaper in print. This analysis has the caveat that the newspaper readership question was not asked in the 2012 wave, so that sample size and power are reduced. Yet, the results suggests a stronger magnitude of the effect among (self-reported) frequent newspaper readers.

On the other hand, engaged news consumers may be less easily swayed by slanted language, while passive consumers with weak priors may be more persuadable. To test this hypothesis, I split the sample into respondents with high vs low level of (self-reported) in-

terest in politics.¹⁵ The results in table 12 suggest that the effects are indeed stronger for respondents with low interest in politics. This holds in the full sample, as well as conditional on frequent newspaper readership (with the caveat of lower power in the latter case).

Views on other policies. If these results reflect a general change in political leanings that by chance happens to be correlated with AP-intensity, we would expect that support for other policies endorsed by the Republican party is also affected in the same direction. In table 13 I present the results of a placebo exercise that tests for an effect on support for policies related to taxation, abortion, gay rights, and the respondent’s assessment of the state of the economy. I find no significant effect of the on any of these outcomes.

Voting. Was the change in immigration policy views enough to shift voting choices? The answer appears to be no – in table 14 I show that the ban had no effect on intentions to vote for the Republican candidate in elections for various offices. One interpretation of these results is that the effect on voters’ views on immigration may not have been large enough to affect voting choices. I do however detect a statistically significant negative effect of the ban on disapproval of President Obama (columns 4 and 8 of table 14). This is in line with the previous results, given Obama’s immigration reform agenda.

4.4 Magnitudes

To facilitate interpretation of the magnitudes of the estimated effects and comparison to other studies in the media literature, it is useful to express them in terms of persuasion rates. The persuasion rate is defined as the share of people who change their behavior, or in this case – change their survey answer, in response to the treatment, out of the ones who could have potentially done so (DellaVigna and Gentzkow 2010).

Expressed in terms of one standard deviation higher AP-intensity, the estimated treatment effect suggests 9.5% fewer “illegal immigrant” over “immigrant” articles per year. Relative to

¹⁵The exact wording of the question is as follows: *Some people seem to follow what’s going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there’s an election going on or not. Others aren’t that interested. Would you say you follow what’s going on in government and public affairs?*

the mean in the ProQuest/ Newslibrary sample this would mean roughly 9 “illegal immigrant” fewer articles per year.¹⁶ The effect of this “treatment” is 0.7 percentage points lower support for border security in the sample of all survey respondents, or 0.9 percentage points in the sample of regular newspaper readers.

The persuasion rate for this treatment, that is, the share of respondents who are dissuaded to support restrictive immigration policy, can be expressed as:

$$f = \frac{db}{de} \frac{1}{1 - b_0}, \quad (7)$$

where b is support for restring immigration, e is exposure to “illegal immigrant” articles, and b_0 is the share of the population that would oppose restrictive immigration policy in absence of the treatment. With the coefficient estimated for the sample of all respondents, and taking into account that about 1/3 of them report that they read a newspaper and an average of 56% support restrictive immigration policy, this implies a persuasion rate of $f = (0.007)/(0.33 * 1) * (1/0.56) \approx 3.8\%$. With the coefficient estimated from the sample of newspaper readers, the implied persuasion rate is $f = (0.009)/(1 * 1) * (1/0.59) \approx 1.5\%$.¹⁷

This magnitude is in the lower end of the effects estimates in the media literature, consistent with the milder nature of the treatment compared to other studies. For comparison, Chiang and Knight (2011) estimate a persuasion rate of 6,5% for the effect of a (surprising) newspaper electoral endorsement on voting intentions for that candidate.

Finally, this analysis and the interpretation of the results has focused on print newspapers, as circulation data allows me to map survey respondents to their respective locally read newspapers. However, views on immigration policy are also affected by consumption of TV and Internet outlets, which may also have been affected by the ban. This matters for the interpretation of the results to the extent that the AP-intensity of other media consumed in

¹⁶The coverage of these data is not universal, so that this should be taken as a lower bound.

¹⁷ It should be noted that here, as standard in the calculations of persuasion rates in the media literature, I am assuming that a newspaper reader reads every article. Relaxing this assumption, e.g. assuming that only a fraction of articles are actually read, would lead to a higher persuasion rate. On the other hand, as documented in section 2, the ban appears to be more salient when it comes to the language used in headlines. Assuming that readers are more likely to pay attention to headlines would therefore lead to a lower persuasion rate.

a given county is positively correlated with that of locally circulated newspapers. In that case, the results would be interpreted as a combined media exposure effect, rather than a per-article effect.

5 Conclusion

This paper has documented a large degree of diffusion of the language used by news wires to media outlets. Changes in their language rules, which are determined centrally rather than in consideration of the political leanings of the owners or readers of a particular media outlet, are therefore a useful source of variation to estimate the effects of media slant on readers.

Applying this strategy, I find evidence consistent with exposure to the term “illegal immigrant” in local media shifting preferences towards more restrictive immigration policy. This provides proof of concept for the hypothesis that politically slanted language can have a persuasive impact. However, this evidence is limited to the setting of unauthorized immigration and to exposure to one particular term. More work is needed to understand the external validity of this mechanism of media persuasion.

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
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6 Figures

6.1 Background and Text Analysis of AP Dispatches

Figure 1: “Illegal Immigrant” in congressional speech and in left- and right-leaning media




Notes: Frequency of mentions of “illegal immigrant” relative to “immigrant” in congressional speech, in cable TV (comparing MSNBC and Fox News) and in newspapers (comparing the Washington Post and the Washington Times) in the years 2009 to 2017. Data sources: Congressional Record, GDELT TV Archive and ProQuest respectively.

Figure 2: The ban reported in the Atlantic




Figure 3: Headlines of “immigrant” dispatches pre- and post-ban




Notes: 50 most frequent tri-grams in the headlines of AP dispatches mentioning the word “immigrant”, published before vs. after the ban.

Figure 4: Change of the language of AP dispatches over time




Notes: Upper panel: Monthly number of AP dispatches mentioning the phrase “illegal immigrant”, as percentage of dispatches mentioning the word “immigrant”. Lower panel: monthly number of AP dispatches mentioning the word “immigrant”.

Figure 5: Correlates of the word “immigrant” before and after the ban




Notes: Top 50 unigrams with highest association with the word "immigrant", before and after the ban. Association defined as the rate of occurrence within the same dispatch. Derivatives of 'immigr' and 'illeg' are not stemmed for illustration purposes as they are treated differently in AP's guidelines.

Figure 6: Phrases most predictive of post-ban publishing date



Notes: Top 20 n-grams ($n \in 1, 2, 3$) in “immigrant” dispatches that are most predictive of a post-ban publishing date (based on χ^2 test).


Figure 7: Change of slant over time



Notes: Evolution of the immigration-specific slant of AP dispatches. Higher values indicate more right-leaning slant. Red line: baseline measure of slant. Blue line: slant computed excluding any phrases containing “illegal immigrant” or its substitutes.


6.2 Diffusion Results

Figure 8: Change of the language of AP-intensive and non AP-intensive media outlets




Notes: Monthly number of articles mentioning “illegal immigrant”, as percent of articles mentioning the word “immigrant”. Blue line: average for outlets with AP-intensity equal to zero. Red line: average for outlets with strictly positive AP-intensity.

Figure 9: Diffusion by degree of AP intensity




Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of frequency of “illegal immigrant” articles as percent of “immigrant” articles on a full set of indicators for quartile of (positive) AP-intensity interacted with Post Ban, controlling for outlet and year-month FEs. The omitted category is AP-intensity = 0. Weighted by number of “immigrant” articles. Standard errors clustered by outlet.

Figure 10: Diffusion over time



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of frequency of “illegal immigrant” articles as percent of “immigrant” articles on full set of indicators for semester pre-/post-ban interacted with AP-intensity, controlling for outlet and year-month FEs. The omitted category is the semester before the ban. Weighted by number of “immigrant” articles. Standard errors clustered by outlet.

Figure 11: Diffusion over time: AP-sourced vs original articles



Notes: Green: Articles sourced from AP (attributed or plagiarized). Blue: All other articles. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of frequency of “illegal immigrant” articles as percent of “immigrant” articles on full set of indicators for semester pre-/post-ban interacted with AP-intensity, controlling for outlet and year-month FEs. The omitted category is the semester before the ban. Weighted by number of “immigrant” articles. Standard errors clustered by outlet.

6.3 Results on Immigration Policy Attitudes

Figure 12: Geographic distribution of AP-intensity by county






Figure 13: County-level correlates of AP-intensity




Notes: Coefficients from univariate regressions of each of the listed county characteristics on AP-intensity. All county characteristics are standardized to facilitate comparison of the magnitudes of the coefficients. Robust standard errors and 95% confidence intervals.

Figure 14: Diffusion over time: county \times year level




Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals on the interactions of AP-intensity with year, conditional on year and county FEs. Standard errors clustered by county.

Figure 15: Support for increasing border security: Reduced form effect by quartile of AP-intensity



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals on the interactions of AP-intensity with survey year, conditional on year and county FEs, respondent controls, and county controls interacted with year FEs. Respondent controls: age, age squared, gender, indicators for race, college, and 1st or 2nd generation immigrant. County controls: log population, racial composition, share foreign born, share college degree, log income per capita, share urban, republican vote share (2012 pres. election) – 2012 levels interacted with year FEs. Standard errors clustered by county.

Figure 16: Support for increasing border security: Reduced form effects over time



Notes: Point estimates and 95% confidence intervals on the interactions of AP-intensity with survey year, conditional on year and county FEs, respondent controls, and county controls interacted with year FEs. Respondent controls: age, age squared, gender, indicators for race, college, and 1st or 2nd generation immigrant. County controls: log population, racial composition, share foreign born, share college degree, log income per capita, share urban, republican vote share (2012 pres. election) – 2012 levels interacted with year FEs. Standard errors clustered by county.

7 Tables

7.1 Diffusion Results

Table 1: Diffusion of the ban depending on AP-intensity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	'Illigal immigrant', pct. of 'Immigrant'				'Illegal immigration' pct. of 'Immigration'
PostBan \times AP intensity	-1.490*** (0.201)	-1.462*** (0.181)	-1.426*** (0.151)	-1.737*** (0.207)	-0.976*** (0.159)
AP intensity	1.716*** (0.215)				
PostBan	-12.497*** (0.757)				
Outlet FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Month FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State \times Year-Month FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Outlet-specific linear trend	No	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	133,349	133,347	133,329	133,329	106,412
Number of outlets	2271	2269	2269	2269	2150
R ²	0.15	0.42	0.49	0.53	0.34
Mean dep. var.	20.79	20.79	20.79	20.79	31.19

Notes: WLS weighted by number of number of "immigrant" articles in columns (1)-(4), and by number of "immigration" articles in column (5). Standard errors clustered by outlet.
Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 2: Alternative specifications

	Not normalized	Unweighted	Word-count	Headlines	AP dummy	Elasticity
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log(1 + 'Illegal Immigrant')		'Illegal immigrant', pct. of 'Immigrant'			
PostBan \times AP intensity	-0.058*** (0.005)	-1.607*** (0.124)	-1.755*** (0.209)	-1.071*** (0.285)		
PostBan \times I[AP-int > 0]					-5.541*** (1.059)	
$(Illimm/Imm)_{AP} \times$ AP intensity						0.121*** (0.022)
Outlet FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	216,709	133,347	124,232	18,976	133,347	131,920
Number of outlets	2271	2269	2160	1414	2269	2269
R ²	0.56	0.21	0.36	0.24	0.42	0.42
Mean dep. var.	0.34	19.52	19.17	14.46	19.52	20.93

Notes: Replication of column (3) of table 1 with the following modifications: (1) Replacing the dependent variable with the log of 1 + number of "illegal immigrant" articles and dropping weights; (2) Regression without weights; (3) Replacing number of articles with word-count; (4) Replacing articles with number of headlines; (5) Replacing continuous AP-intensity with a dummy for positive AP-intensity; (6) Replacing *PostBan* with the time-series of "illegal immigrant" articles (normalized by "immigrant" articles) released monthly by AP. Standard errors clustered by outlet.

Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 3: Alternative measures of AP-intensity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	'Illegal immigrant', pct. of 'Immigrant'			
PostBan \times AP-intensity: AP credited	-1.437*** (0.191)			
PostBan \times AP-intensity: AP plagiarized		-1.434*** (0.209)		
PostBan \times AP-intensity: AP credited, <i>all articles</i>			-1.318*** (0.201)	
PostBan \times Reuters-intensity: Reuters credited, <i>all articles</i>				0.280 (0.362)
Outlet FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	133,347	133,347	123,261	129,344
Number of outlets	2269	2269	2218	2421
R ²	0.42	0.42	0.39	0.40
Mean dep. var.	20.79	20.79	21.39	21.16

Notes: Replication of column (3) of table 1 with the following alternative measures of AP-intensity. Column (1): share of “immigrant” articles credited to AP. Column (2): share of “immigrant” articles flagged by a plagiarism algorithm. Column (3): share of all articles published in the 12 months before the ban that are credited to AP. Column (4): share of all articles published in the 12 months before the ban that are credited to Reuters. Standard errors clustered by outlet.

Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 4: AP-sourced vs. original articles

	(1) AP-credited	(2) AP-plagiarised	(3) not AP-sourced
PostBan \times AP intensity	-1.029*** (0.124)	-0.175*** (0.021)	-0.364** (0.185)
Outlet FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	133,469	133,469	133,404
Number of outlets	2269	2269	2269
R ²	0.42	0.10	0.44
Mean dep. var.	0.77	0.22	16.31

Notes: WLS weighted by number of number of "immigrant" articles. Standard errors clustered by outlet. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 5: Heterogeneity by slant

	(1) Slant < p33 Dem.	(2) p33 \geq Slant < p66 Center	(3) Slant \geq p66 Rep.
PostBan \times AP intensity	-1.849*** (0.471)	-0.841* (0.440)	-1.137** (0.494)
Outlet FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	9,295	9,522	9,421
Number of outlets	101	107	111
R ²	0.55	0.48	0.50
Mean dep. var.	17.61	22.28	25.32

Notes: WLS weighted by number of "immigrant" articles. Standard errors clustered by outlet. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 6: Synonyms of “illegal immigrant” and volume of immigration coverage

	(1) AP-approved synonyms pct. of 'Immigrant'	(2) 'Undocumented immigrant' pct. of 'Immigrant'	(3) 'Immigrant' pct. of total articles	(4) 'Immigration' pct. of total articles
PostBan \times AP intensity	0.317*** (0.061)	0.001 (0.126)	-0.002 (0.006)	0.002 (0.005)
Outlet FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	133,188	133,330	204,175	204,180
Number of outlets	2269	2269	2162	2162
R ²	0.20	0.34	0.55	0.48
Mean dep. var.	5.06	8.74	0.62	0.51

Notes: WLS weighted by number of “immigrant” articles in column (1), and by total articles in columns (2) and (3). Standard errors clustered by outlet. AP-approved synonyms are “living in the country illegally/ without legal permission”, “enter(-ing/-ed) the country illegally/ without legal permission”. Standard errors clustered by outlet.

Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

7.2 Results on Immigration Policy Attitudes

Table 7: Views on immigration policy: Reduced form

	Reduced Form				
	(1) Index Restrict Imm.	(2) Border	(3) No Amnesty	(4) Don't hire	(5) Question
PostBan \times AP-intensity	-0.0125*** (0.005)	-0.0046*** (0.002)	-0.0011 (0.002)	-0.0081*** (0.002)	-0.0045** (0.002)
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs \times County controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-Stage F stat.	161,490	161,490	161,490	74,055	118,529
Observations	2,113	2,113	2,113	1,924	2,066
Number of counties	0.26	0.14	0.16	0.13	0.22
R ²	0.01	0.56	0.52	0.62	0.41

Notes: Reduced form OLS regressions. Respondent controls: age, age squared, gender, race, college, 1st or 2nd generation immigrant, and political ideology. County controls: log population, share urban, racial composition, share foreign born, share college degree, log income per capita, newspaper circulation per capita and Republican vote share.

Standard errors clustered by county. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 8: Views on immigration policy: 2SLS

	2SLS				
	(1) Index Restict Imm.	(2) Border	(3) No Amnesty	(4) Don't hire	(5) Question
'Illegal imm.', pct. of 'Imm.'	0.0136** (0.006)	0.0050** (0.002)	0.0012 (0.002)	0.0073*** (0.003)	0.0056** (0.003)
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs × County controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-Stage F stat.	23.63	23.63	23.63	20.48	12.77
First-Stage coef. on PostBan × AP-intensity	-0.9223*** (0.190)	-0.9223*** (0.190)	-0.9223*** (0.190)	-1.1043*** (0.244)	-0.8028*** (0.225)
Observations	161,490	161,490	161,490	74,055	118,529
Number of counties	2,113	2,113	2,113	1,924	2,066
R ²	0.22	0.10	0.12	0.09	0.16
Mean dep. var.	0.01	0.56	0.52	0.62	0.41

Notes: 2SLS regressions (upper panel), along with the corresponding 1st-stage coefficients (lower panel). Respondent controls: age, age squared, gender, race, college, 1st or 2nd generation immigrant, and political ideology. County controls: log population, share urban, racial composition, share foreign born, share college degree, log income per capita, newspaper circulation per capita and Republican vote share. Standard errors clustered by county. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 9: Support for increasing border control

	Reduced Form				2SLS		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	<i>"Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border.": Selected</i>						
PostBan \times AP-intensity	-0.0044*** (0.002)	-0.0049*** (0.002)	-0.0046*** (0.002)	-0.0046** (0.002)			
AP intensity	0.0047*** (0.002)						
PostBan	-0.0186*** (0.006)						
'Illegal imm.', pct. of 'Imm.'					0.0055** (0.002)	0.0050** (0.002)	0.0065** (0.003)
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs \times County controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
County FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year \times State FEs	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
First-Stage F stat.	9.90	23.63	12.19
First stage coef on PostBan \times AP-intensity					-0.8859*** (0.282)	-0.9223*** (0.190)	-0.7104*** (0.204)
Observations	162,057	161,943	161,490	161,490	161,943	161,490	161,490
Number of counties	2,236	2,122	2,113	2,113	2,122	2,113	2,113
R ²	0.12	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.10	0.10	0.10
Mean dep. var.	0.56	0.56	0.56	0.56	0.56	0.56	0.56

Notes: Reduced form OLS regressions in the left hand-side panel, 2SLS regressions in the right hand-side panel. Respondent controls: age, age squared, gender, race, college, 1st or 2nd generation immigrant, and political ideology. County controls: log population, share urban, racial composition, share foreign born, share college degree, log income per capita, newspaper circulation per capita and Republican vote share.

Standard errors clustered by county. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 10: Support for increasing border control: Alternative measures of AP-intensity

	Reduced Form				2SLS		
	(1) Border	(2) Border	(3) Border	(4) Border	(5) Border	(6) Border	(7) Border
PostBan \times AP-intensity: AP credited	-0.0047*** (0.001)						
PostBan \times AP-intensity: Plagiarism detection		-0.0037** (0.002)					
PostBan \times AP-intensity: AP credited, <i>all articles</i>			-0.0028** (0.001)				
PostBan \times Reuters-intensity: Reuters credited, <i>all articles</i>				-0.0006 (0.003)			
'Illegal imm.', pct. of 'Imm.'					0.0057*** (0.002)	0.0047* (0.002)	0.0050** (0.002)
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs \times County controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-Stage F stat.	20.11	16.69	14.86
PostBan \times AP-intensity: AP credited					-0.8255*** (0.184)		
PostBan \times AP-intensity: Plagiarism detection						-0.8004*** (0.196)	
PostBan \times AP-intensity: AP credited, <i>all articles</i>							-0.5729*** (0.149)
Observations	161490	161490	148271	149681	161490	161490	148271
Number of counties	2113	2113	1767	1789	2113	2113	1767
R ²	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.10	0.10	0.10
Mean dep. var.	0.56	0.56	0.55	0.55	0.56	0.56	0.55

Notes: Reduced form OLS regressions in the left hand-side panel, 2SLS regressions in the right hand-side panel. Respondent and county controls as in previous table. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 11: Heterogeneity by newspaper readership

	Reduced Form			2SLS		
	(1) Not Reader	(2) Reader	(3) Print Reader	(4) Not Reader	(5) Reader	(6) Print Reader
PostBan \times AP-intensity	-0.0011 (0.003)	-0.0041 (0.003)	-0.0061** (0.003)			
'Illegal imm.', pct. of 'Imm.'				0.0017 (0.005)	0.0063 (0.004)	0.0092* (0.005)
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-Stage F stat.	.	.	.	8.99	9.43	8.87
First-Stage coef. on PostBan \times AP-intensity				-0.6406*** (0.214)	-0.6522*** (0.212)	-0.6700*** (0.225)
Observations	57837	66591	40103	57837	66591	40103
Number of counties	1844	1805	1596	1844	1805	1596
R ²	0.15	0.16	0.16	0.10	0.11	0.10
Mean dep. var.	0.54	0.56	0.59	0.54	0.56	0.59

Notes: Reduced form OLS regressions in the left hand-side panel, 2SLS regressions in the right hand-side panel. Reader = 1 if read newspaper in the past 24 hours. Print reader = 1 if read print newspaper in the past 24 hours.

Respondent controls: age, age squared, gender, race, college, 1st or 2nd generation immigrant, and political ideology. County controls: log population, share urban, racial composition, share foreign born, share college degree, log income per capita, newspaper circulation per capita and Republican vote share.

Standard errors clustered by county. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 12: Heterogeneity by interest in politics

	Reduced Form				2SLS			
	(1) High interest	(2) Low interest	(3) Reader & high interest	(4) Reader & low interest	(5) High interest	(6) Low interest	(7) Reader & high interest	(8) Reader & low interest
PostBan \times AP-intensity	-0.0036* (0.002)	-0.0063** (0.003)	-0.0008 (0.004)	-0.0112* (0.006)				
'Illegal imm.', pct. of 'Imm.'					0.0038* (0.002)	0.0069** (0.003)	0.0012 (0.005)	0.0179 (0.012)
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-Stage F stat.	25.17	21.31	8.34	6.03
First-Stage coef. on PostBan \times AP-intensity					-0.9344*** (0.190)	-0.9162*** (0.203)	-0.6910*** (0.228)	-0.6702** (0.282)
Observations	85774	71349	26750	12439	85774	71349	26750	12439
Number of counties	1939	1875	1361	1058	1939	1875	1361	1058
R ²	0.20	0.10	0.21	0.15	0.15	0.05	0.14	0.02
Mean dep. var.	0.61	0.50	0.61	0.54	0.61	0.50	0.61	0.54

Notes: Reduced form OLS regressions in the left hand-side panel, 2SLS regressions in the right hand-side panel. Reader = 1 if read newspaper in the past 24 hours. Print reader = 1 if read print newspaper in the past 24 hours. High interest = 1 if interest in politics, low interest = 1 if interest in politics ...

Respondent controls: age, age squared, gender, race, college, 1st or 2nd generation immigrant, and political ideology. County controls: log population, share urban, racial composition, share foreign born, share college degree, log income per capita, newspaper circulation per capita and Republican vote share.

Standard errors clustered by county. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 13: Views on other policies

	Reduced Form				2SLS			
	(1) Taxes	(2) Economy	(3) Abortion	(4) Gay marriage	(5) Taxes	(6) Economy	(7) Abortion	(8) Gay marriage
PostBan \times AP-intensity	0.0002 (0.001)	0.0012 (0.001)	-0.0015 (0.002)	-0.0024 (0.002)				
'Illegal imm.', pct. of 'Imm.'					-0.0002 (0.002)	-0.0013 (0.002)	0.0016 (0.002)	0.0027 (0.002)
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs \times County controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-Stage F stat.	23.47	23.38	23.77	23.51
First-Stage coef. on PostBan \times AP-intensity					-0.9196*** (0.190)	-0.9185*** (0.190)	-0.9245*** (0.190)	-0.9209*** (0.190)
Observations	158,737	157,848	160,631	160,265	158,737	157,848	160,631	160,265
Number of counties	2,108	2,109	2,110	2,112	2,108	2,109	2,110	2,112
R ²	0.08	0.23	0.20	0.22	0.05	0.16	0.13	0.17
Mean dep. var.	0.45	0.42	0.47	0.42	0.45	0.42	0.47	0.42

Notes: “Taxes” = 1 if would rather cut public spending than increase taxes. “Economy” = 1 if believe the economy has gotten worse over the past year. “Abortion” = 1 if oppose always allowing women to have an abortion as matter of choice. “Gay marriage” = 1 if oppose gay marriage. Reduced form OLS regressions in the left hand-side panel, 2SLS regressions in the right hand-side panel. Respondent controls: age, age squared, gender, race, college, 1st or 2nd generation immigrant, and political ideology. County controls: log population, share urban, racial composition, share foreign born, share college degree, log income per capita, newspaper circulation per capita and Republican vote share.

Standard errors clustered by county. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table 14: Voting Intentions

	Reduced Form				2SLS			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
	President	Senate	House	Obama Disapprove	President	Senate	House	Obama Disapprove
PostBan \times AP-intensity	-0.0026 (0.002)	0.0025 (0.002)	0.0031 (0.002)	-0.0028** (0.001)				
'Illegal imm.', pct. of 'Imm.'					0.0019 (0.002)	-0.0039 (0.004)	-0.0033 (0.002)	0.0030** (0.001)
Respondent controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs \times County controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-Stage F stat.	32.04	8.66	24.07	23.83
Observations	76,800	97,803	143,835	156,428	76,800	97,803	143,835	156,428
Number of counties	1,931	1,993	2,093	2,109	1,931	1,993	2,093	2,109
R ²	0.47	0.40	0.38	0.48	0.42	0.35	0.32	0.43
Mean dep. var.	0.35	0.39	0.36	0.51	0.35	0.39	0.36	0.51

Notes: Intent to vote for Republican candidate in Presidential, House and Senate elections, and disapproval of President Obama. Reduced form OLS regressions in the left hand-side panel, 2SLS regressions in the right hand-side panel. Respondent controls: age, age squared, gender, race, college, 1st or 2nd generation immigrant, and political ideology. County controls: log population, share urban, racial composition, share foreign born, share college degree, log income per capita, newspaper circulation per capita and Republican vote share. Standard errors clustered by county.. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A Appendix: Background on the AP Stylebook

The Stylebook entry before the ban

illegal immigrant Used to describe those who have entered the country illegally, it is the preferred term, rather than *illegal alien* or *undocumented worker*.

Do not use the shortened term *illegals*.

The Stylebook entry after the ban

illegal immigration Entering in a country in violation of civil or criminal law. Except in direct quotes essential to the story, use *illegal* only to refer to an action, not a person: *illegal immigration*, but not *illegal immigrant*. Acceptable variations include *living in* or *entering a county illegally* or *without legal permission*.

Expect in direct quotations, do not use the terms *illegal alien*, *an illegal*, *illegals* or *undocumented*.

Do not describe people as violating immigration laws without attribution. Specify wherever possible how someone entered the country illegally and from where. Crossed the border? Overstayed a visa? What nationality?

People who were brought into the county as children should not be described as having immigrated illegally. For people guaranteed a temporary right to remain in the U.S. under the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals program, use *temporary resident status*, with details on the program lower in the story.

Figure A1: AP style after the ban

The image shows a document editor window titled "bin Laden.docx". A preview pane displays a document snippet: "Documents from **Osama Bin Laden**'s compound in Pakistan are to go online later this...". Below the preview is a red progress bar and the text "1 of 3".

Below the preview, the main text reads "bin Laden, Osama" with the "AP" style indicator. A "Proposed Change" box shows the change from "Osama bin Laden" to "Osama bin Laden" (with a green checkmark icon). Below the box are icons for comments, a green checkmark, and a red "ALL" button.

Below the editor, a text block provides instructions: "Use *bin Laden* on all references except at the start of a sentence. It is the family preference for the last name, which is an exception to the general rule on Arabic names. He founded al-Qaida and was killed by U.S. forces in Pakistan in May 2011."

A Appendix: Data

A.1 Computation of Slant

In this section I describe the procedure for computing an index for the immigration-specific slant of AP dispatches released in each quarter. This follows the method developed by Gentzkow and Shapiro (2010).

I start off with the set of all Congressional speeches for the period 2009-2017 that mention the word “immigrant” and find the 500 phrases (3 to 4-grams) that are most predictive of the speakers’ party based on the Pearson’s χ^2 statistic. In one version of the slant measure, in this step I exclude phrases that contain the term “illegal immigrant” and its substitutes.

For this set of phrases, I compute their relative frequency in the speech of each Congressional representative: $\tilde{f}_{pc} = f_{pc} / \sum_p f_{pc}$. I then regress relative frequency an indicator for the party of the representative, obtaining phrase-specific intercept and slope coefficients α_p and β_p .

Finally, I compute the relative frequency of each phrase in AP dispatches released in a given quarter – \tilde{f}_{pq} – and regress $(\tilde{f}_{pq} - \alpha_p)$ on β_p . The resulting slope coefficient is the quarter-specific measure of slant.

A.2 Plagiarism Detection Algorithm

In this section I describe the algorithm I use to identify “immigrant” articles that are copied from AP but do not necessarily credit AP.


The first step of the algorithm is to assign to each article a set of AP dispatches that could potentially have been used in the writing of the article. I focus on AP dispatches released in the day before publication and mentioning the word “immigrant”.¹⁸ This is a simplified version of the procedure used in Cage et al. (2020), which first clusters articles by the event they cover, and then forms the set of potentially plagiarized articles as those that

¹⁸I do not use contemporaneous (same-day) AP-dispatches because the origin of the content is more ambiguous in this case – text similarity could be due the media outlet copying AP, or to AP redistributing content produced by a member outlet.

cover the same event and are published prior to the article of interest. The second step in the algorithm is to compute a measure of verbatim copying. I pre-process all texts by removing punctuation and stop-words, stemming, and tokenizing into 5-grams. I then measure the share of the article’s text that is identical to each paired dispatch and take the maximum over all paired dispatches. I label an article as copied from AP if the maximum text overlap exceeds 20% (equivalent to 70 characters, relative to the mean text length of 350).

Figure B1 presents the relationship between copying and crediting AP, plotting the average share of credited articles by bin of the copy-rate distribution (i.e. by share of text overlapping with an AP dispatch). It is notable that even among articles whose lead paragraph is virtually identical to an AP dispatch (with 90-100% identical text), the rate of crediting AP never exceeds 60%. In other words, relying on attribution to AP alone would have missed a substantial volume of copied articles. When collapsed at the media outlet level however, the correlation between the two measures is 0.83.

Figure B1: AP-copy rate: Attribution and plagiarism



A.3 The CCES Survey

A.3.1 Immigration Questions

What do you think the U.S. government should do about immigration? Select all that apply.

- Fine US businesses that hire illegal immigrants.
(-07, -12, -14, -17)
 - Grant legal status to all illegal immigrants who have held jobs and paid taxes for at least 3 years, and not been convicted of any felony crimes.
(-07, -10, -11, -12, -14, -16, -17)
 - Increase the number of border patrol on the US-Mexican border.
(-07, -10, -11, -12, -14, -16, -17)
 - Build a wall between the US and Mexico.
(-07, -17)
 - Allow police to question anyone they think may be in the country illegally.
(-10, -11, -12, -14, -17)
 - Prohibit illegal immigrants from using emergency hospital care and public schools.
(-12)
 - Deny automatic citizenship to American-born children of illegal immigrants.
(-12)
 - Identify and deport illegal immigrants.
(-14, -16, -17)
 - Grant legal status to people who were brought to the US illegally as children, but who have graduated from a U.S. high school.
(-16)
-

A Appendix: Additional Analysis of AP Text

A.1 Examples

Pre-Ban

Senate panel OKs letting non-citizens, including illegal immigrants, get driver's licenses

18-Mar-2013 – ST. PAUL, Minn. (AP) — Bills that would let illegal immigrants get a Minnesota driver's license are moving forward at the Capitol. The Senate Transportation and Public Safety Committee on Monday passed a bill to ease restrictions on driver's licenses for non-U.S. citizens. A House committee endorsed a similar bill last week. Sen. Bobby Joe Champion, a Minneapolis Democrat, says his bill would make Minnesota roads safer by funneling more drivers through the state's driving test and making it easier for them to buy automobile insurance. Republicans say the change could lead to unintended consequences, like illegal immigrants using state IDs to vote. The bill passed 10-7, with all Democrats in favor and all Republicans voting against it.

Post-Ban

Immigrant driver's license bill takes step forward in Oregon Senate committee work

16-Apr-2013 – SALEM, Ore. (AP) – An Oregon Senate committee has advanced a bill granting four-year driver's licenses to people who can't prove they're legally in the United States. The Senate Business and Transportation Committee approved the measure Monday on a 4-2 vote. The bill would allow immigrants who have lived in Oregon for at least a year and meet other requirements to apply for driver's cards without proving legal presence. The card would be valid for only four years— half as long as a standard Oregon license— and would state "driving privilege only." Supporters say it will make Oregon roads safer because there would be fewer untrained and uninsured drivers, but opponents say it could create a culture of crime in the state. The bill goes to a legislative budget committee.


A.2 Text Analysis by Topic

Topic Model Estimation. In order to classify AP's articles mentioning into into distinctive topics, I estimate a Latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) model on the corpus covering the entire sample period. In order to limit possible mechanical effects due . I set the number of topics to 5, which produce compact and interpretable topics – a larger number of topics tends to produce more subtopics of the 5 overarching ones – e.g. a separate topic on immigrant crimes versus their prosecution. The resulting topics are presented in Figure C1 and can be labeled as follows: law enforcement and prosecution, legislation related to immigration, immigrants' integration and social issues such schools and family, international immigration issues such as the European refugee crisis, and immigrants' role in elections.

The lower panel shows the distribution of the average topic weights before and after the ban. Enforcement, legislation and integration emerge as the main topics, while European immigration and elections play a lesser role.

I assign each AP dispatch the single topic with the highest estimated weight. Finally, with this classification at hand, in Figures C2 and C3 I replicate the analysis from Figures 5 and 6 separately for each topic.


Figure C2: Correlates of the word “immigrant” before and after the ban; Estimated separately by topic



09

Notes: Top 50 unigrams with highest correlation with the word "immigrant", before and after the ban. Correlations defined based on rate of occurrence within the same article. Derivatives of 'immigr' and 'illeg' are not stemmed for illustration purposes.


Figure C3



A Additional Results


A.1 Diffusion: Sample of Print Newspapers

Figure D1: Change of the language of AP-intensive and non AP-intensive media outlets




Notes: Monthly number of “illegal immigrant” articles, as percent of “immigrant” articles. Blue line: average for outlets with AP-intensity equal to zero. Red line: average for outlets with strictly positive AP-intensity.

Figure D2: Diffusion by degree of AP intensity




Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of frequency of “illegal immigrant” articles as percent of “immigrant” articles on a full set of indicators for quartile of (positive) AP-intensity interacted with Post Ban, controlling for outlet and year-month FEs. The omitted category is AP-intensity = 0. Weighted by number of “immigrant” articles. Standard errors clustered by outlet.

Figure D3: Diffusion over time



Notes: Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of frequency of “illegal immigrant” articles as percent of “immigrant” articles on full set of indicators for semester pre-/post-ban interacted with AP-intensity, controlling for outlet and year-month FEs. The omitted category is the semester before the ban. Weighted by number of “immigrant” articles. Standard errors clustered by outlet.

Figure D4: Diffusion over time: AP-sourced vs original articles



Notes: Green: Articles sourced from AP (attributed or plagiarized). Blue: All other articles. Coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from a regression of frequency of “illegal immigrant” articles as percent of “immigrant” articles on full set of indicators for semester pre-/post-ban interacted with AP-intensity, controlling for outlet and year-month FEs. The omitted category is the semester before the ban. Weighted by number of “immigrant” articles. Standard errors clustered by outlet.

Table D1: Diffusion of the ban depending on AP-intensity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	'Illegal immigrant', pct. of 'Immigrant'				'Illegal immigration', pct. of 'Immigration'
PostBan \times AP intensity	-1.235*** (0.230)	-1.228*** (0.216)	-1.299*** (0.177)	-1.791*** (0.251)	-0.785*** (0.150)
AP intensity	0.982*** (0.249)				
PostBan	-14.378*** (0.990)				
Outlet FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Month FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
State \times Year-Month FEs	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Outlet-specific linear trend	No	No	No	Yes	No
Observations	63,820	63,820	63,568	63,568	52,297
Number of outlets	815	815	813	813	733
R ²	0.20	0.43	0.53	0.56	0.35
Mean dep. var.	21.68	21.68	21.64	21.64	32.34

Notes: WLS weighted by number of number of "immigrant" articles in columns (1)-(4), and by number of "immigration" articles in column (5). Standard errors clustered by outlet.
Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D2: Alternative specifications

	Not normalized	Unweighted	Word-count	Headlines	AP dummy	Elasticity
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
	Log(1 + 'Illegal Immigrant')		'Illegal immigrant', pct. of 'Immigrant'			
PostBan \times AP intensity	-0.059*** (0.006)	-1.027*** (0.164)	-1.219*** (0.239)	-1.140*** (0.340)		
PostBan \times I[AP-int > 0]					-3.779*** (1.294)	
$(Illimm/Imm)_{AP} \times$ AP intensity						0.084*** (0.027)
Outlet FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	77,204	63,820	57,014	12,662	63,820	63,141
Number of outlets	815	815	733	659	815	815
R ²	0.52	0.20	0.38	0.22	0.43	0.43
Mean dep. var.	0.64	22.95	20.67	14.86	22.95	21.82

Notes: Replication of column (3) of table 1 with the following modifications: (1) Replacing the dependent variable with the log of 1 + number of "illegal immigrant" articles and dropping weights; (2) Regression without weights; (3) Replacing number of articles with word-count; (4) Replacing articles with number of headlines; (5) Replacing continuous AP-intensity with a dummy for positive AP-intensity; (6) Replacing *PostBan* with the time-series of "illegal immigrant" articles (normalized by "immigrant" articles) released monthly by AP. Standard errors clustered by outlet.

Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D3: Alternative measures of AP-intensity

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	'Illegal immigrant', pct. of 'Immigrant'			
PostBan \times AP-intensity: AP credited	-1.073*** (0.225)			
PostBan \times AP-intensity: AP plagiarized		-1.269*** (0.241)		
PostBan \times AP-intensity: AP credited, <i>all articles</i>			-0.963*** (0.231)	
PostBan \times Reuters-intensity: Reuters credited, <i>all articles</i>				0.660 (0.520)
Outlet FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	63,820	63,820	57,220	57,604
Number of outlets	815	815	740	748
R ²	0.43	0.43	0.41	0.41
Mean dep. var.	21.68	21.68	23.12	23.01

Notes: Replication of column (3) of table 1 with the following alternative measures of AP-intensity. Column (1): AP-intensity defined as share of “immigrant” articles published in the 12 months before the ban that are either credited to AP or flagged by a plagiarism algorithm (baseline). Column (2): share of “immigrant” articles credited to AP. Column (3): share of “immigrant” articles flagged by a plagiarism algorithm. Column (4): share of all articles published in the 12 months before the ban that are credited to AP. Standard errors clustered by outlet.

Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D4: AP-sourced vs. original articles

	(1) AP-credited	(2) AP-plagiarised	(3) not AP-sourced
PostBan \times AP intensity	-1.179*** (0.156)	-0.184*** (0.026)	-0.362 (0.239)
Outlet FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	63,890	63,890	63,853
Number of outlets	815	815	815
R ²	0.44	0.10	0.48
Mean dep. var.	1.00	0.30	16.40

Notes: WLS weighted by number of number of "immigrant" articles. Standard errors clustered by outlet. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D5: Synonyms of “illegal immigrant” and volume of immigration coverage

	(1) AP-approved synonyms pct. of 'Immigrant'	(2) 'Undocumented immigrant' pct. of 'Immigrant'	(3) 'Immigrant' pct. of total articles	(4) 'Immigration' pct. of total articles
PostBan \times AP intensity	0.294*** (0.080)	0.053 (0.162)	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.004)
Outlet FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year-Month FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	63,810	63,863	70,111	70,110
Number of outlets	815	815	733	733
R ²	0.21	0.39	0.54	0.46
Mean dep. var.	5.21	8.31	0.63	0.50

Notes: WLS weighted by number of “immigrant” articles in column (1), and by total articles in columns (2) and (3). Standard errors clustered by outlet. AP-approved synonyms are “living in the country illegally/ without legal permission”, “enter(-ing/-ed) the country illegally/ without legal permission”. Standard errors clustered by outlet.

Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

A.2 Views on Immigration Policy

Table D6: Views on immigration policy: Reduced form; **county-level**

	Reduced Form				
	(1) Index Restrict Imm.	(2) Border	(3) No Amnesty	(4) Don't hire	(5) Question
PostBan \times AP-intensity	-0.0206* (0.011)	-0.0086** (0.003)	-0.0035 (0.004)	-0.0117** (0.005)	-0.0082* (0.004)
Year FEs \times County controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-Stage F stat.	9,239	9,239	9,239	3,536	7,232
Observations	2,104	2,104	2,104	1,768	2,040
Number of counties	0.39	0.35	0.38	0.58	0.41
R ²	0.26	0.61	0.59	0.67	0.49

Notes: Reduced form OLS regressions in the left hand-side panel. County controls: log population, share urban, racial composition, share foreign born, share college degree, log income per capita, newspaper circulation per capita and Republican vote share. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D7: Views on immigration policy: 2SLS; **county-level**

	2SLS				
	(1) Index Restrict Imm.	(2) Border	(3) No Amnesty	(4) Don't hire	(5) Question
'Illegal imm.', pct. of 'Imm.'	0.0244* (0.013)	0.0102** (0.005)	0.0042 (0.004)	0.0112** (0.005)	0.0108* (0.006)
Year FEs × County controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
County FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
First-Stage F stat.	36.83	36.83	36.83	29.08	20.27
First-Stage coef. on PostBan × AP-intensity	-0.8408*** (0.138)	-0.8408*** (0.138)	-0.8408*** (0.138)	-1.0508*** (0.195)	-0.7588*** (0.168)
Observations	9,239	9,239	9,239	3,536	7,232
Number of counties	2,104	2,104	2,104	1,768	2,040
R ²	-0.05	-0.09	-0.01	-0.13	-0.11
Mean dep. var.	0.26	0.61	0.59	0.67	0.49

Notes: 2SLS regressions (upper panel), along with the corresponding 1st-stage coefficients (lower panel). County controls: log population, share urban, racial composition, share foreign born, share college degree, log income per capita, newspaper circulation per capita and Republican vote share. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.

Table D8: Support for increasing border security: **county-level**

	Reduced Form			2SLS			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
	<i>"Increase the number of border patrols on the US-Mexican border.": Selected</i>						
PostBan \times AP-intensity	-0.0083** (0.003)	-0.0079** (0.003)	-0.0086** (0.003)	-0.0098** (0.004)			
AP intensity	0.0093*** (0.003)						
PostBan	-0.0186 (0.012)						
'Illegal imm.', pct. of 'Imm.'					0.0082** (0.004)	0.0102** (0.005)	0.0121** (0.005)
Year FEs \times County controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
County FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FEs	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year \times State FEs	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
First-Stage F stat.	44.40	36.83	31.70
First-Stage coef. on PostBan \times AP-intensity					-0.9661*** (0.145)	-0.8408*** (0.138)	-0.8140*** (0.144)
Observations	9,407	9,274	9,239	9,224	9,274	9,239	9,224
Number of counties	2,245	2,112	2,104	2,101	2,112	2,104	2,101
R ²	0.01	0.34	0.35	0.36	-0.07	-0.09	-0.11
Mean dep. var.	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61	0.61

Notes: Reduced form OLS regressions in the left hand-side panel, 2SLS regressions in the right hand-side panel. County controls: log population, share urban, racial composition, share foreign born, share college degree, log income per capita, newspaper circulation per capita and Republican vote share. Significance levels: * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$.